Operation Askari

Operational Years

Objective of the Operation

Die doel is om die infiltrasie van Swapo se Spes Eenheid na die suide te stuit en hierdie operasie moet van middel November 1983 van stapel gestuur word en enige propagandavoordeel wat Swapo beoog moet verhoed word

Algemene riglyne

1. Die vyand moet nie binnelands nie maar reeds in die buiteland gestuit word.

2. Diep verkenning gekoppel aan offensiewe aksies moet op 'n vroee stadium begin

3. Daar moet maksimum van mobiele elemente gebruik gemaak word vir opvolgdoeleindes

4. Beplanning moet vroegtydig vir verhoogde magspeile voorsiening maak

5. Daar moet beplan word op 'n vermoe om hoedigtheidsoperasies in die vlak gebied te lei

6. Ons moet die vyand bind, die vyand moet ons nie bind nie

7. Maksimum benutting van die hindernis in die weste(Kunenerivier) is noodsaaklik

8. Die poging moet geordend wees dwarsdeur die gebied sodat onnodige troepeverskuiwings aas gevolg van noodmaatreels nie nodig sal wees nie

9. 'n Komops plan om ontvoerings die hoof te bied moet reeds van Desember 1983 geimplememteer word

10. Interne bataljons moet verseker dat beskermingsplanne vir veral skole vanaf begin Januarie 1984 geimplememteer word

11. Grense tussen sektore en bataljons moet aangepas word volgens die inligtingsprent om die beste resultate vir die stuiting van 'n infiltrasie te bewerkstellig. Daar moet beplan word op 'n Taakmag Oos en 'n Taakmag Wes.SAP(K) moet meer bewegingsvryheid geniet in die vlak buitelandse gebied tot op die 50 Noordermeting

12. Nagoptrede van te voet troepe is uiters noodsaaklik om Swapo te dwing om dag en nag te beweeg

13. Teenaksies vir optrede teen klein groepe is noodsaaklik veral noord van die kaplyn. afseeloperasies met maksimum gebruik van Claymores moet doelbewus beplan word

14. ons uitgangspunt moet proaktiewe en reaktiewe optrede wees nie

15. Dwarssny in die middelgebiede is noodsaaklik sodat enige vars spore SSM opgetel kan word

16. 'n Infiltrasie tydens 1984 mag eenvoudig net nie plaasvind nie. Daar mag nie eers 10 terre daarin slaag om in te sypel nie

Composition of 61 Mechanised Battalion Group

Commander: Commandant Ep van Lill
2IC: Major Koos Liebenberg
Personnel Officer: Lieutenant Ferdie de Vos

Personal Impressions of the Commander

Die perspektiewe van kommandant Gert van Zyl

Inleiding

Teen einde 1983 het dit weer geblyk dat SWAPO magte besig was om te versamel en in die suide van Angola op te bou, waarskynlik om gereed te maak vir ‘n aanslag in die komende reënseisoen. Met so ‘n opbou het hulle van die beskerming van FAPLA mag ontplooiings en basisse gebruik gemaak.

Die doel van Operasie Askari was om hierdie magsopbou in die wiele te ry deur FAPLA ontplooiings te teiken. Die hoofteiken was Cuvelai en die konvensionele meg taakmag, saamgestel uit hoofsaaklik burgermag eenhede onder bevel van kolonel Tobie van Schalkwyk, moes die offensief uitvoer.

Die ontplooiing van 61 Meg en beplanning vir die operasie

61 Meg Bataljon Groep moes wes van die Kunene ontplooi om die FAPLA magte by Cahama en verder noord te verhoed om in te meng deur steekaanvalle op die Cahama ontplooings uit te voer en hulle besig te hou terwyl die offensief teen Cuvelai geloods word.
Met bogenoemde as agtergrond was daar voldoende tyd om vir Operasie Askari te beplan, voor te berei en samesmelting te doen. Beplanning vir hierdie operasie het reeds in November 1983 begin.

Jaarlikse bevorderings en verplasings

November was ook die tyd dat die SA Leër se jaarlikse bevorderings en verplasings plaasgevind het. Teen die verwagting in is ek bevorder en verplaas as bevelvoerder 1 SAI Bataljon, Bloemfontein. Kommandant Ep van Lill was aangestel as die nuwe Bevelvoerder 61 Meg Bataljon Groepp.

In oorleg met brigadier Joep Joubert, bevelvoerder Sektor 10, is besluit dat ek Operasie Askari sou begin en dat kommandant Ep van Lill êrens gedurende die operasie my sou aflos aangesien daar onsekerheid was oor wanneer Operasie Askari sou klaarmaak.

Die Kunenerivier word oorgesteek in Desember

Sommige van 61 Meg se toevoeging moes nog vanaf die RSA inkom en georienteer word. Die totale mag is derhalwe stuksgewys verplaas na ‘n voor konsentrasie/ versamelgebied by Xangongo waar die finale voorbereidings gedoen en orders gegee was. Op D Dag, êrens in Desember, het die saamgestelde taakmag die Kunene by Xangongo oorgesteek.

61 Meg se eerste doelwit

Ons eerste doelwit was Quiteve, ongeveer 100km noordwes langs die Kunene rivier. Hierdie keer was ons toegerus met ‘n sateliet navigasie toestel wat ons in staat gestel het om akkuraat in die bos te navigeer. Tydens ‘n eerstelig aanval op D plus 1, was feitlik geen teenstand ondervind nie. Slegs ‘n paar pap wiele en ‘n mortier skrapnelwond aan een van die aanvalsmag se troepe, was van die enigste ongevalle.

61 Meg beweeg in Cahama se rigting

Na hierdie aanval moes 61 Meg wes in die rigting van Cahama beweeg om die taak soos opgelê, uit te voer. Verkenningselemente noord van Quiteve het egter rapporteer dat ‘n mobiele FAPLA mag suid beweeg en ‘n bedreiging vir eie magte sou inhou. Die hulp van die Lugmag op Ondangwa is ingeroep wat hierdie mag sonder moeite uitgesorteer en aansienlike verliese toegedien het.

Die nuwe bevelvoerder word per helikopter afgelaai

Die opmars in die rigting van Cahama het na laaste lig D plus 2 begin en teen 24h00 was ‘n veggroeplaer getrek. Met eerste lig die volgende oggend het ‘n helikopter geland en vir kommandant Ep van Lill afgelaai.

Hy het sommer so in die beweeg oorgeneem en ek en die 2IB, majoor Chris Roux wat ook verplaas was, is met dieselfde helikopter terug Oshakati toe.

The perspectives of commandant Ep van Lill

Introduction

I was appointed at the end of 1983 as commander of 61 Mech, and I had to take over from commandant Gert van Zyl, not knowing that the planning of Operation Askari had already been completed.

I had to report immediately for service at 61 Mech and was flown straight to Oshakati where General George Meiring and Brigadier Joep Joubert brought me up to speed with events.

At that stage Operation Askari had already commenced and our forces were already in Angola.

My orders

The orders I received were short and sweet – I had to relieve commandant Gert van Zyl in the lines and it was my responsibility to cut the water and lights of Cahama, an Angolan town situate approximately 100 kilometres on the main road from the town of Xangongo.

My laconic response to this was that I had no previous experience with municipalities, but that I would try my best.It was then explained to me that 61 Mech had to isolate Cahama from its support lines with the aim to exhaust and demoralize the enemy force based there to such an extent that they either fled or surrendered.

61 Mech was also asked to avoid any direct confrontation with the enemy.

These requirements posed unique challenges

This type of operation where the enemy had to be isolated and demoralized, was an operation that needed to be conducted over a prolonged period of time in order to be successful.

Another challenge was the fact that Operation Askari took place during December/January, the rainy season in Angola. Up to that time it was the belief that the terrain during that time of the year was not accessible to vehicles or conducive to mechanised operations.

Operation Askari was then the first operation of its kind to take place during December.

Arrival

Just before Christmas 1983 I was transported by helicopter to take over command of 61 Mech, and the same helicopter picked up commandant Gert van Zyl, his 2IC, adjudant and logistics officer without even switching off its rotor blades.

Major Koos Liebenberg became the tempory 2IC of 61 Mech and lieutenant Ferdie de Vos, a Citizen Force member from the Rand Afrikaans University Military Unit, became my personnel officer for this operation.

Initial actions and reactions

During December 1983, 61 Mech conducted numerous probing attacks on Cahama which illicited heavy reactions from the enemy forces based at this Angolan town.

From enemy messages that were intercepted it became apparent that the forces at Cahama urgently needed to receive logistical replenishment and also suffered casualties that had to be evacuated.

At that stage neither logistical replenishment nor casualty evacuations by the enemy forces at Cahama was possible because of the fact that 61 Mech succeeded in totally isolating this town.

Attack on Cahama on 31 December 1983

Incredible pressure was put on South Africa at this time to withdraw from Angola and the South African Defence Force urgently needed to show some success for all its efforts.

61 Mech then received the order to attack Cahama from the south on 31 December 1983.

As part of this attack 61 Mech had to complete what was the first operational bridge crossing by the South African Defence Force since the Second World War, and this took place just north of Xangongo.The Sappers had to build a Bailey bridge for 61 Mech to cross, and on the same day 61 Mech attacked Cahama from a south-western direction.

This attack was repelled by FAPLA and a counter attack by FAPLA tanks forced 61 Mech to withdraw its attack.

The South African Defence Force was adamant that the principle of minimum own forces casualties had to be maintained at all costs.

The attack on Cuvelai

I was tasked to return to our HQ at Xangongo where I was instructed to assemble a strong combat team to join Battle Group Delta, a battle group composed of Citizen Force members. Battle Group Delta had as target the enemy forces at the Angolan town of Cuvelai.

I was flown by helicopter to Battle Group Delta where we had to plan and execute a joint attack on Cuvelai, which was situate approximately 64 kilometers north of the town of Mupa.

The combat team from 61 Mech joined Battle Group Delta and in my capacity as combat group commander of the joint Battle Group Delta and 61 Mech forces I issued orders for this attack.

We moved in for the attack the next day, but because it rained that day and because the terrain was very closed, we battled with our navigation to the target. (That was long before the time of the GPS)

Late that afternoon we made contact with the enemy and then realized that we had to cross a minefield on our way to the target, while the enemy was firing at us with tanks.

I ordered the battle group to withdraw and lager for the night.

The next morning we attacked. Major CP du Toit was the commander of the combat team that led the assault and the battle lasted the whole day. At last light that that was left of the enemy, had fled and we could occupy the target.

We captured lots of enemy equipment, including a SAM 8 battery.

Conclusion

Although Cuvelai was a target allocated to Battle Group Delta, the truth must be told that this Citizen Force unit was not prepared to proceed with this attack and 61 Mech was the force responsible for the attack on Cuvelai. Battle Group Delta only joined 61 Mech the day after the attack on Cuvelai.

To this day I feel strongly about the fact that the attack on Cuvelai should be recognised as an attack by 61 Mech, and not by another South African force.

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