61 Mech Battalion Group (First badge)

Battle Group Juliet had tested the concept of a multi-arm mechanised unit; now all the lessons learnt and all the development work on modern mechanised warfare in the African battle space could be systematically formalised, and the resulting unit honed to a fine edge.

The new unit, although officially part of the South African Infantry Corps, would actually be a dedicated multi-arm regiment consisting of permanently grouped infantry, armour and artillery elements, plus the usual support assets.

The three teeth arms would not merely be

co-operating, they would form one integrated whole, with all that that implied, both operationally and doctrinally. The infantryman, the armoured man and the gunner would be fingers on the same mailed fist; the dividing line between armour and mechanised infantry in particular would now become blurred, once and for all.

The new unit was the brain-child of the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant-General Constand Viljoen, and for its founding father he selected his personal staff officer, 34-year-old Commandant Johann Dippenaar. The very fact that an Armoured Corps officer was picked to command 61 Mech Battalion– something which, it seems, did not sit easily at first with some infantry officers - can be taken as a sign of the changing doctrinal times. In May 1978 Commandant Dippenaar had served as a liaison officer with Battle Group Juliet during Operation Reindeer, and now had to establish a permanent mechanised unit in the South West African operational area.

Viljoen moved fast to put his conception on the ground. In November 1978 Dippenaar was appointed SO1 Operational Planning at 2 Military Area Headquarters – the later Sector 10 headquarters - at Oshakati, and also commanding officer of the new mechanised unit, which was to be stationed at the Oshivello training ground. Dippenaar similarly wasted no time in drawing up his plans for the unit, which initially was called “60 Mechanised Battalion Group”, but was then re-numbered to avoid confusion with the existing Sector 60. Its new name was 61 Mechanised Battalion Group, which was immediately shortened to just “61 Mech” by all concerned.

The as-yet unformed 61 Mech was to have a basic structural resemblance to Frank Bestbier’s Battle Group Juliet, but that was where the similarity ended. In every other respect it was one of a kind. The SADF’s main requirement in the South West African deployment was obviously for light infantry units which were primarily trained and equipped for counter-insurgency operations, or temporarily converted conventional-warfare ones. 61 Mech, on the other hand, might fall under Sector 10 command, but it was to be structured, equipped, prepared and tasked primarily for conventional duties.

61 Mech would be the SWATF’s mobile conventional strike component for use when heavier elements were needed. Among other things this would include launching swift pre-emptive strikes on SWAPO concentrations north of the border, dealing with any enemy force seeking to intervene in any future external operations, and attacking any conventional aggressor force threatening South West African sovereignty. At the same time it also had to be available for countering any insurgent raids southwards from the Ovamboland sector of the operational area into the southern farmlands in the area around Tsumeb.

61 Mech’s structure was tailored to the much larger and more flexible role envisaged for it.

Its training would be, as it were, of a post-graduate nature, with officers and men who were already fully fledged mechanised infantrymen, gunners or armoured soldiers being prepared for snap conventional and semi-conventional operations in the African battle space. To this end, 61 Mech was to have two mechanised infantry companies in Ratel-20s, provided by 1 SAI; an 81mm mortar platoon; an anti-tank platoon; an armoured car squadron manned by 1 or 2 Special Service Battalions; an artillery battery from 4 Field Regiment; an engineer troop; and the requisite logistical and technical elements.

In time of need the armoured cars’ highly trained mechanised infantry support sections could also be used as pure infantry, and 61 Mech could be speedily reinforced by a company of paratroopers from 1 Parachute Battalion stationed at HQ Sector 10; although not mechanised, the paratroopers were famously efficient and tactically flexible fighting men.

Additional combat support and combat service support troops, such as protection companies and engineers, could be drawn at short notice from a variety of feeder units based in South Africa or South West Africa/Namibia.

So although 61 Mech’s set-up was an unusual one, it was finely geared to the requirement and stood the test of time during the next decade, when the regiment saw extensive service both in counter-insurgency operations against SWAPO south of the border and as a potent conventional force during external operations. In the process it became the test-bed for the development of the highly mobile bush warfare at which the South Africans were to prove so adept.